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rnternational Coordination of Trade Policy
ABSTRACT
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a coordination compact.
Tariff bindings illustrate a mechanism for making commitments credible.
Reciprocity illustrates a means for redistributing cooperative gains. The
Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) principle illustrates an attempt to keep coordination
"virtuous" (cooperative) rather than "vicious" (collusive).
Yet international trade policy coordination has clearly become more dif—
ficult. The postwar hegemonic environment has evolved into a more general stra-
tegic environment with several influential governments and blocs. Such
coalitions are a natural evolutionary development, yet one that inexorably
undermines MFN. Economic developments make a country's comparative advantage
increasingly sensitive to sectoral predation by others, especially through sub-
sidies and performance requirements aimed at mobile multinational firms, which
are themselves internationally coordinated. Immobile workers and others
correspondingly bear the burdens of sharper adjustments, and look to government
to turn its trade policy narrowly inward in order to ease their load. Such
"domestication" of trade policy is the antithesis of international coordination,
and runs the risk of creating a strategic paralysis of recurring unproductivity.
What changes might restore the liberalizing impetus of trade policy coor-
dination? Several are considered in the paper. One is extension of the "Codes"
approach to multilateral negotiations under the GAIT, especially to Subsidies
and Safeguards.
Many reflections in the paper are framed in categories from recent economic
thinking about policy coordination in "strategic" environments --thosewith
small numbers of self-consciously interdependent agents. The paper argues that
these are the appropriate environments in which to analyze international coor-
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The post-World-War II record of sovereign governmentscoordinating their
international trade policies is really quite impressive. Yet itseems recently
to have lost the luster that characterized its early life. Somerecent
initiatives have seemed to cartelize rather than liberalize. Othershave
failed to achieve coordination of any kind, dissolving indisarray. Fears
cannot easily be calmed that the conventions and structures ofpostwar trade
policy coordination are crumbling. Open hostility, military metaphors, and
an air of frontier vigilantism are today quite common in trade policy
discussions.
International trade policy coordination has clearly become more difficult.
The postwar hegemonic environment has evolved into amore general strategic
environment with several influential governments and blocs. Newpatterns of
initiative and response have been slow to develop. Newtemptations have arisen
for governments to abandon seemingly outdated conventions ofcooperation,
causing the system to retreat toward uncoordinated hostility. The growth of
administered protection, aggressive reciprocity, andselectivity all illustrate.
International trade policy coordination is further complicatedby economic
developments. Some make a country's comparative advantage increasinglysen-
sitive to sectoral predation by others, especiallythrough subsidies and perfor-
mance requirements aimed at multinational firms. Workers and others
correspondingly bear the burdens of sharper adjustments, and look to government2
to turn its trade policy narrowly inward in order to ease their load. Such
"domestication" of trade policy is the antithesis of international coordination.
What changes might restore the liberalizing impetus of postwar trade policy
coordination at its best? Several are considered in the paper. One is exten-
sion of the "Codes" approach to multilateral negotiations under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT). The Subsidies Code in particular seems
ripe for refining, and ideas for development of a Safeguards Code are assessed.
Standing GAIT committees, with representative membership and regular meetings
are discussed, as are several ways that their independent leadership might be
enhanced. A case is made that European and Japanese capacity to initiate
coordinated liberalization is much greater and more promising than is generally
acknowledged, as is that of even quite small countries in "minilateral" set-
tings. Discreet preferential coordination is viewed as a way to rebuild trust
and to write new rules and establish new precedents in administrative trade
policy --rulesand precedents that could eventually come to be accepted
even by currently combattive countries.
Many reflections in the paper are framed in categories from recent economic
thinking about policy coordination in "strategic" environments --thosewith
small numbers of self-consciously interdependent agents. I am hopeful that com-
mentators on the paper will provide balancing admixtures of complementary
perspective, institutional detail (e.g., beyond the GAIT), and operational
feasibility. They will no doubt also provide important insight on other trade-
policy issues, not all of which concern coordination. Readers with limited
interest in an introduction to "strategic" perspectives should find it easy to
skim Part I and read Part II with more care.
At the cost of lengthening the discourse, I have tried to make it minimally
"acronomyous." Thus I have resisted adopting IPC (eye-pick), ITPC (it-pick),3
and NITPC (nit-pick) as shorthand for international (trade) policy coordination
or lack thereof. At the cost of exposing my ignorance, I have tried to draw a
few insights from game theory, political science, history, and law. The nature
of the topic seemed to compel it.I suspect I will be thanked for the first,
and hope I can be forgiven for the second.4
I. POSTWAR TRADE POLICY COORDINATION
IN STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
A. Introduction
It seems quite natural to address a paper on coordination to international
trade policy. It is a border policy that discriminates between foreign and
domestic residents in goods and services transactions, thus always involving at
least two countries and governments. There are many varieties. Free trade is
properly understood as the absence of any domestic/foreign discrimination (not
the absence of government regulation), and national treatment as the absence of
any added discrimination once border barriers have been "cleared." Most-
favored—nation (MFN) treatment is the absence of discrimination among foreign
residents of differing nationalities, and tariffs are discriminatory taxes.
Because trade policy always involves choices concerning international
discrimination, it is fitting to ask about policy coordination --orits lack.
Rules, aggression, unfair treatment, and similar terms all have natural use-
fulness in discussing trade policy.
At first blush, monetary and fiscal policy seem different from trade
policy; they are really not. Monetary, fiscal, and trade policies all have
discriminatory border effects that are quite similar. Monetary structure is a
quintessential border policy, delineating regions of differing legal tender.
Many taxes fall on residents of one country but not others. The ratio of
government to private purchases can affect an economy's internal price ratio of
domestic to foreign goods just like trade policy, because government purchases
are usually concentrated on domestic goods. These similarities suggest that
students of trade policy coordination and students of macroeconomic policy5
coordination have lessons to learn from each other.1 Several are suggested below.
1
So, too, might students of other kinds of international policy coor-
dination; see Cooper (1986) for an instructive linking of public health to
macroeconomic coordination.6
B. Retrospective Insights from a Simple Structure
The word "coordinate" is defined by Webster to be
to bring into a common action, movement, or
condition: regulate and combine in harmonious
action: HARMONIZE
The key words in the definition suggest interdependence and mutuality. When
applied to trade policy the idea of coordination suggests that each country's
government fashions it conscious of its effect on other governments' trade
policy, and that the intended outcome is mutually advantageous to all.
Interdependence and mutuality are hardly revolutionary traits. They have
permeated the past forty years' trade agreements among governments, most
significantly under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT).
Interdependence and mutuality grew out of abhorrence of the consequences of
world economic war followed by full-scale world war.2
2See Cooper (1987, pp. 299-301) or Baldwin (1984b,pp. 5-9) for an account
along these lines of the growth of the U.S. Trade Agreements Program. It is
easy to forget that the genesis of those agreements was the burden of trade
repression during the hostile trade wars of the early 1930s. For the United
States, which legislated the infamous Smoot—Hawley tariffs in 1930, the
constant-dollar value of trade (exports plus imports) fell 35 percent between
1929 and 1934, almost half again further than real GNP, which fell 24 percent
(U.S. Department of Commerce (1976), p. 324). Overall world trade volume
declined 25 percent (GATT (1986a, p. 31)) during the same period.
Today there is malaise that interdependence and mutuality are being
abandoned world-wide, and especially in the United States. Interdependent
consciousness is on the defensive ("other countries be damned, we've got to
do something about our trade deficit"), and mutuality is waning ("we've let
ourselves passively be pushed around long enough; now it's time to teach those
guys a lesson").7
Are there good reasons for malaise? Is the future for trade-policy coor-
dination quite bleak? If so, is that so bad? These questions are addressed at
many points below.
It is remarkable that the most familiar economic apparatus for analyzing
trade policy is ill—suited for answering these questions. It applies toper-
fectly competitive environments with independent governments. Coordination
questions arise only in "strategic environments." These insights were obscured
in the early postwar period by the dominance of the United States in global
trade. Yet even that period can be instructively described from strategic
perspectives (see Section 118).
Strategic environments are those in which the number of economic agents
making interdependent decisions is relatively small. Each agent takes into
account some counterresponse from rivals in calculating its best course of
action. Actions include threats and promises, bluster and bluff, collaboration
and commitment, all aimed at influencing the outcome of an endeavor toward one's
objectives. These are familiar features of games, war, and policy coordination.
They have little place in the environment traditionally employed by economists
to analyze trade policy.
In the perfectly competitive environment, each of many agents considers
itself too small to influence market outcomes and, therefore, too small to be
noticed. Each, therefore, makes choices assuming that all rivals' variables are
given. Governments in the traditional framework are independent. They presume
that their policies affect market equilibrium, but do not account for the way
that they may affect the behavior of other governments.3 When agents take8
3Framers of trade policy are always quite mindful of other governments, as
are a few analyses as well, most notably Johnson (1954). Otherwise brief
mentions of retaliation, but little analysis, appears in traditional economic
commentary.
their rivals' actions to be immutable, strategic behavior plays no role, and
coordination cannot even be characterized. Furthermore, there are only weak
analytical defenses for trade policy of any sort except free trade.
Thus the analysis of policy coordination must begin in strategic environ-
ments.4 The "prisoner's dilemma" model of Table 1B.1 is a primitive strategic
4lhere are fundamental insights about policy coordination from analysis
of competitive environments, but such analysis nevertheless begs the central
question. Traditional competitive analysis can generate the ideas that open
international trade is a global public good, that some governments may be
tempted therefore to "free ride," and that a country's trade barriers create
impacts abroad of the same character as externalities (spillovers). Some sort
of mechanism would be desirable to alleviate the public good/free
rider/externality problems and seems on the face of it to require international
policy coordination. The crucial question being begged, though, is what incen-
tive motivates any one of a large number of competitive governments to create
and maintain coordination with others. What "internalizes the externalities"?
Perfectly competitive assumptions rule out much of the motivational impetus for
policy coordination from the start. If someone protests that in reality a
number of governments are large, not atomistic, then such a protestor has impli-
citly accepted the need for strategic analysis, perhaps without realizing it,
and has also pointed to the kind of strategic bargaining (pricing) that does
internalize the externalities in the fashion of Coase (1957).
environment in which to draw some simple first insights about historic trade—
policy coordination. One is that uncoordinated trade policy --policythat
independently takes other countries' policy strategy as given --canlead to an
outcome that, although rationally chosen, is unfortunate in the retrospective
evaluation of each government. Each would prefer the cooperative outcome, but9
TABLE 1B.1
GAINS AND LOSSES FROM ALTERNATIVE TRADE POLICIES
IN A "PRISONER'S DILEMMA"




"Our" nation's trade policy liberalize) or promote)
Cooperative initiative +1for us -2for us
(reciprocally liberalize) +1for them +3for them
Noncooperative initiative +for us -1for us
(actively protect or promote) -2for them -1for them
TABLE 1B.2
"GAINS" AND "LOSSES" FROM ALTERNATIVE TRADE POLICIES
WITH A HOSTILE OPPONENT
FOR THE SAME PRISONER'S DILEMMA




"Our" nation's trade policy liberalize) or promote)
Cooperative initiative +1for us -2for us
(reciprocally liberalize) 0 for them +5for them
Noncooperative initiative +for us —1for us
(actively protect or promise) -5for them 0 for them10
some form of coordination is necessary to attain and maintain it --specifically
some communication and guarantee that each government will "play" the coopera-
tive initiative and not "cheat." Without such a guarantee, uncoordinated
national self-interest suggests that each government play non-cooperatively.
Each will be better off whether rival governments do the same ("we" would lose
-1 instead of -2) or try to cooperate (we gain 3 instead of 1). Without coor-
dination the grim outcome is trade war, well illustrated by early 1930s.
The outcome of uncoordinated policy is less grim in a succession of encoun-
ters like that modelled in Table 1B.1. Experience and analysis show that a
good uncoordinated trade-policy strategy (called TIT for TAT) is to play
cooperatively unless cheated, then to retaliate (play non-cooperatively),
but only once until cheated again.5 Nevertheless, it is obvious that a
See Brander's (1986, pp. 36-43) or Richardson's (1986, pp. 270—274)
account, each of which applies to trade policy the extensive research of politi-
cal scientist Robert Axelrod (1983) to repeated prisoner's-dilemma games.
succession of coordinated cooperative outcomes would be even better for each
country than lIT for TAT, or certainly no worse. Thus coordination still looks
desirable for the richer, dynamic version of this model.
The past forty years provide many illustrations of the apparent desirability
of coordination, and also of what helps attain it.
(1) Coordination Compacts. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
is a fine illustration of a coordination compact, in which governments coor-
dinate by: (i) negotiating rules of cooperative play (e.g., "fair trade"),
defining non—cooperation (cheating, e.g., "nullification and impairment")
and potential penalties for non-cooperation (compensation, retaliation);
(ii) exchanging pledges of cooperative behavior (by becoming signatories),11
and agreeing thereby to consult and ultimately to accept the stipulated
penalties if they violate their pledge. Penalties for non-cooperation are
complemented by rewards for cooperation, often involving redistribution (side
payments) of the collective gains. In the GAIT such redistribution is reflected
in the principle of reciprocity introduced in its Preamble (in practice, the
value of concessions offered and advantages received should be approximately
equal), and also in the major exception to the principle (developing countries
are freed from strict reciprocity in order to redistribute gains toward them --
implicitlythe side payment for their continued cooperation).
In brief, the GAIT is a compact that establishes communication and conven-
tions to facilitate coordination. A tighter compact might also have established
an institution that monitors and/or polices trade policy, with independent power
to reward cooperation and penalize non-cooperation. This the GAIT is not,
except for very limited monitoring. It contrasts with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), which is a quasi-independent (yet representative) institu-
tion with greater ability to monitor (surveillance)6 and limited powers to
6me word "surveillance" in GATTparlance entails each signatory's
obligations to publish all trade measures, to consult, and if necessary, to
participate in dispute settlement procedures. In essence, each member thereby
monitors all the others; no central institution does so.
police (quota requirements, interest charges and payments, conditionality,
limits on cumulative access). Had the International Trade Organization (ITO)
not been aborted in 1950 (see Diebold (1952)), the institutional support for
trade policy coordination might be closer today to that for monetary coor-
dination. (Whether this would necessarily be a "good" thing is another question
entirely, addressed below.)12
(2) Common Objectives. Communication, conventions, compacts, and coor-
dinating institutions come about only if there is enough mutual agreement among
governments on objectives. Such agreement might be said to be a primordial con-
dition for coordination devices to be attractive (see Cooper (1986, 1987)), and
was quite influential in the postwar design of the GATT. Governments were
nearly unanimous in their attraction to cooperative outcomes.7
71n the the primitive model of Table 1B.1 each government agrees that the
objective is to maximize its own country's feasible gains without regard to what
the other country achieves. Since +3 is infeasible without luck, foolishness,
or coercion (a kind of coordination by force), each government prefers +1 to —1
and is attracted to proposals to create coordination devices.
This impetus for coordination can vanish, however, if mutuality of objec-
tive is undermined, as may be happening today. The structure of Table 18.1
provides a simple illustration. Suppose "their" government were to become
determinedly hostile to "ours," even to the point of valuing our loss as much as
their gain.8 The implied objective for them would become the difference in
8The obvious characterization of this objective is "cutting off one's nose
to spite one's face" It is an all-too-familiar posture for agents in hostile
conflict. Trade embargoes are a good example.
their payoff and ours in Table 1B.1, 3—(-2), -1—(-1), -2-3, and 1—i, moving
clockwise from the northeast quadrant. The new payoff matrix is given in Table
1B.2. Its innovation is that there is no longer any attraction for the hostile
government to cooperative trade over trade war. Perceived gains are 0 in either
case. Coordination may be infeasible because it takes two to make peace, but
only one to break it.13
The difference-in-objectives problem obviously grows worse if bothgovern-
ments are hostile toward each other.9 Then goals are inconsistent, and neither
Objectives might then seem to be common again, but they are not. "My"
goal is the distance between me and you; "yours" is the distance betweenyou and
me.
government sees any attraction in coordinating. Trade wars like the 1930s are
more enduring than under simple uncoordinated policy, because they cannot be
shaken by any mere provision of information, institutional reform,encourage-
ment, or exhortation. What is needed before these devices is stabilization of
hostility (cease—fire), then reconciliation if possible, ideas that are
reflected in the GAIT principles of "standstill" and "rollback". Without
genuine standstill and rollback, coordination for mutual gain is as impossible
among hostile trade negotiators as it was between Hatfields and McCoys!1°
10
See, for example, the Uruguay-Round invocation of these principles in GAIT
(1986b, p. 3)). Camps and Diebold (1983, p.55) remark that
The approach we suggest is based on reason....But
governments are apt to be driven by more immediate aims,
by a sense of damage and a wish to rectify matters.
One general lesson of postwar coordination is that it is very toughamong
agents with different objectives and may be impossible among agents with incon-
sistent objectives. A corollary is that momentum toward coordination can be
maintained by limiting the scope for cooperative initiative to like-minded
trading partners, and isolating hostile ones.11 Correspondingly, an organization14
The sheer number of participants can matter, too, for reasons described
in note 4. Having too many potential participants makes the negotiating
environment more competitive, less strategic, and reduces the motivational
incentives for each government to contribute toward cooperative initiative.
Thus to limit the scope by limiting the number of participants enhances
coordination in its own right; choosing like-minded participants enhances
coordination further. It is in this light that one can understand why each
of the Tokyo-Round "codes" for non-tariff measures was negotiated by an
interested sub-group within the GAIT, and why each maintains its own list
of signatories --withimplicit discrimination against non—signers. See further
discussion in Section 11B2.
of sufficiently hostile governments can easily become paralyzed, with inadequate
constituency for any attempt to reclaim or enhance coordination. The view that
the GATT has reached this point is evaluated below.
(3) Common Structural Understanding. Agreement on objectives is, in turn,
possible only if there is sufficient common understanding among governments on
the payoffs to alternative trade-policy initiatives, and therefore on the struc-
ture of world trade that links policy to payoffs. Such common understanding
might be said to be a "pre-primordial" condition for coordination devices to
be attractive.
In this regard, it is sobering to consider how ill—developed is professional
consensus on empirical models of global trade patterns and the effects of trade
policy --ill-developedeven by comparison to empirical models of global
macroeconomics (e.g., the IMF's multilateral exchange-rate model), which are
widely acknowledged to have their own distinct problems. It is arresting to
learn from macroeconomic research (Frankel (1986), Frankel and Rockett (1986))
that when models differ across participants, policy coordination fails to
improve macroeconomic performance almost as often as it succeeds. Similarly
arresting is Baldwin's and Clarke's (1985) finding that non-cooperative solu-
tions to conflict over alternative Tokyo-Round tariff-cutting formuli seemed15
superior for all protagonists to the compromise formula that actually emerged
from coordinated negotiation.12
12
The issue of common understanding of payoffs and behavior is discussed
further in Cooper (1986) and Hoitham (1986).16
C. Deeper Dimensions of Postwar Trade Policy Coordination
Trade policy coordination is of course much more subtle and complex than
in the preceding account. There are at least four deeper dimensions: scope,
virtue, instrument, and motive force.
(1) Scope. Prospects for trade-policy coordination and its outcome depend
very much on its scope. Scope has three important variants. Geographical scope
determines which governments are involved, whether coordination is multilateral,
"minilateral," or bilateral, involving all trading partners, some, or only one.
Mutuality/hostility, as described above, is one criterion for determining
the most promising geographical scope for coordination efforts. It also
influences the choice of substantive and sectoral scope --whatissues are to
be covered, and for what sectors. Postwar trade policy coordination has empha-
sized trade in manufactured commodities, in part because trade in agriculture,
services, corporate capital (e.g. investment, rights of establishment), and
labor effort (e.g., immigration, guest workers) were inflamatory by comparison.
Coordination was pursued on substance and in sectors where mutuality was
feasible; substance and sectors where hostility reigned were isolated. By com-
parison to postwar trends, mutuality seems more feasible today for trade in some
services, some corporate capital, and perhaps certain agricultural sectors. But
international hostility seems to have grown in standardized labor-intensive
manufactures such as textiles/apparel and basic metals.
Another criterion for determining the most promising scope for coordination
is the "fluidity of side payments," how easy it is to exchange concessions on
one issue with one trading partner for advantages on another issue with another
trading partner. Recent trade policy coordination has employed two principles17
to enhance fluidity. One isacross-the—boardbargaining, with limited excep-
tions lists, which allows for concessions and advantages to be exchangedfluidly
from sector to sector. An older principle is non-discrimination (as definedby
MFN --concessionsmust be offered to all trading partners, not just some),
which allows for "inequities" in some bilateral tally of concessions and advan-
tages to be offset fluidly by "windfalls" in some other.13 It is obvious how
13Baldwin (1987) gives a usefulaccount of both principles.
important it is for fluid side payments to have common understanding among
governments on payoffs and the underlying structure (model) of trade, as
described above. Otherwise measures of concessions and advantages are wildly
different among participants.
There is unavoidable tension between these criteria for scope. Caution to
avoid hostile undermining of coordination encourages narrow ScOpe; concern to
lubricate the distribution of benefits from coordination encourages widescope.




Camps and Diebold (1983, pp.29-30) illustrate this tension nicely:
The goal is ...toimprove the conditions of international
agricultural trade ....Butthere is also a need to protect
the rest of the GAIT system from the impact of fierce
disputes about agriculture ...[which]can hinder progress
on other subjects.
So does the Uruguay—Round declaration (GATI (1986b, p.2)), albeit with the
appearance of double speak:
Balanced concessions should be sought within broad trading
areas and subjects to be negotiated in order to avoid
unwarranted cross-sectoral demands.18
(2) Virtue. Policy coordination by itself may have little value indepen—
dent of its "virtue." The case for coordination is probably strongest where the
case for policy intervention itself is strongest, and weaker elsewhere. Thus in
public health (Cooper (1986)) where externalities and international spillovers
are clear and even quantifiable, the case for coordination is strong. In
influencing the sectoral/industrial structure, however, where the case for
government policy is less universally acknowledged, the case for coordination is
weaker. This perspective may help to explain why the IMF found readier approval
in the United States after World War II than the ITO; there was readier approval
at that time of an active role for government in macroeconomics than in
microeconomics.
This lesson has been blurred in recent commentary on trade policy. There
is an unwarranted tendency to believe that international policy coordination
is by its very nature "good," and to neglect the possibility that uncoor-
dinated unilateral policy may be "better." Virtue and coordination do not
necessarily go hand in hand.15 Language alone provides a way to appreciate
15See Keohane (1984) for an extensive discussion.
this. Almost any outcome described as coordinated or cooperative could also
be described as collusive.Almost any outcome described as uncoordinated (or
chaotic!) could be described as competitive. Exactly the same formal struc-
ture supports coordination of very different timbre--coordination that signals
harmonious forums full of respectful give-and—take in the mutual pursuit of
noble goals; and collusion that sounds like closed, mean-spirited cartels
which victims deride as vicious old-boy networks. It is all too easy to slip
into the benign belief that the objective of government is the "public good,"
so that coordinated pursuit of that good is good in itself and to be desired.19
It is all too easy to forget public—choice and other grounds for skepticism
that government's objectives are prima facie good, on which coordinatedpur—
Suit of dubious objectives becomes doubly dubious.16
'6One might think of this as the "bad-ideas-are-better-botched"principle.
Postwar trade policy provides many illustrations. A traditional defense of
MFN treatment is that it constrains the formation of predatory and other "bad"
coalitions (coordinations) of trading partners; legitimate customs unions and
free trade areas are, however, excused from MFN because these coalitions are on
balance "good" (liberalizing). It is arguable that international policy coor-
dination has been just as thorough and strong in recent cartelization of global
steel trade and the market sharing negotiated under successive Multi-Fiber
Arrangements (MFAs) as it was in the Toyko, Kennedy, and earlier rounds of
GAIT-sponsored trade negotiations. Voluntary export restraints (VERs) are bila-
teral examples of deliberalizing coordination. Their ambiguous name has merit,
though; they do involve a side payment (compensation) to the "offending" parties
in order to maintain coordination —-theimplicit "quota rents" (Deardorff
(1986)). Although deliberalizing, they are nevertheless cooperative, and thus
not as hostile as a unilateral protective counter against an import surge.
Concerns about virtue would be mere fretting if the size of the gains or
losses from coordination were small)7 Some empirical research seems to suggest
17See Oudiz and Sachs (1984) foran approach to this question for macroecono-
mic policy coordination.
that these gains and losses are indeed small. Deardorff and Stern (1984) find
that the economic welfare gains from elimination of all post-Tokyo-Round tariffs20
are infinitesimal; Whalley (1985, pp. 180-184) finds that the gains from elimi—
nation of tariffs and all other deliberalizing post-Tokyo-Round trade barriers
to be less than one half of one percent of world income. Kreinin (1974, Ch.3)
estimates the gains to the original six members of the European Economic
Community (EEC) as around one and one half percent of their 1970 national
income, but MacBean and Snowden (1981, Ch. 8) find the estimate diminished as
the EEC expanded to nine members, due to losses from the Common Agricultural
Policy (itself arguably an example of deliberalizing coordination).
These calculations are misleadingly small estimates, however, of the
gains from maintaining the status-quo level of coordination relative to trade
war. They estimate instead the difference between the status quo and free
trade. If the real status quo is far to the right along a continuum running
from "trade war" to "free trade," then the measured gains to further "virtuous"
coordination will be small, but the potential losses from failure of existing
coordination or from extreme deliberalizing coordination might be huge. In the
famous (infamous?) bicycle metaphor of trade policy coordination, there may be
little additional momentum to squeeze into a bicycle cruising reasonably close
to its maximum speed, but a great deal of momentum to lose if the bicycle were
to fall down. Or, it's a long way down the slippery slope to the valley when
you're close to the peak.
Whalley (1985) in fact estimates both kinds of gains and losses. His very
rough calculations of the losses from trade war relative to status-quo coor-
dination appear in Table 1C.1. They are surprisingly large, especially for
Europe and Japan, five to ten times larger than the gains to be achieved from
further "virtuous" coordination.
For reasons described in Section II, preserving the virtue of current coor-
dination is the modern trade policy challenge, not perfecting it. Table 1C.121
TABLE 1C.1
PERCENT OF GNP LOST
DUE TO MULTILAJERAL
TRADE WARS
All trading areas adopt....
"First ste"
.60% tariff2 optimal tariff
United States 0.4 2.3
European Community 2.2 5.9
Japan 2.2 5.9
Rest of World 0.1 1.5
1Average of compensating variations (CV) and equivalent variations(EV).
2Rates assessed to all imports inpresence of existing non-tariff
barriers and factor taxes.
3Apparent optimal tariff against theaggregate of all other trading
regions assuming no retaliation.
Source: Whalley (1985, p 248).22
suggests that this challenge does indeed have quantitative importance for the
entire world.
(3) Instrument. Another deeper dimension of trade policy coordination is
the choice of instruments relied on to encourage it. Here the most important
distinction is between rules and discretion. At one extreme the compacts of
coordination may attempt to legislate meticulous rules that the institutions
of coordination correspondingly adjudicate. At the other extreme, the com-
pacts may simply specify regular meetings for communication that the institu-
tions convene and inform. Policy coordination via the Bank for International
Settlements and the June summit meetings have the latter spirit; the GAIT
historically has the former.
Reliance on rules makes most sense when issues and policies can be reaso-
nably defined and measured. Otherwise rules require immense resources to draft
and monitor, and can easily appear arbitrary and inequitable. Discretion,
discussion, diplomacy, entreaty are often more productive and cost-effective
when issues and policies are hard to define and measure.18 In this light one
18Parenting offers many illustrations. So does the discussion of how
"constitutions" come about and what they contain, as applied to trade policy
notably by the late Jan Tumlir (Tumlir (1985), Banks and Tumlir (1986)).
can interpret the GAIT's historic rules-centeredness as fitting the historic
reliance of the world on objectively measurable tariffs and quotas. GAIT tariff
bindings are in fact an excellent example of a rule aimed at avoiding surrep-
titious cheating on the compacts of coordination. (Such rules are known as
"credible pre-commitments" in the language of strategic policy coordination.)
One can correspondingly defend the more consultative flavor of the Tokyo Round's
codes for non—tariff measures as fitting the world's relative shift toward admi-23
nistrative policy instruments (see Table 2B.4 and the surrounding discussion).
It is instructive along these lines to wonder if the Toyko-Round code
dealing with the most measurable non-tariff measure, subsidies, has been
generally regarded as the least successful code precisely because it could have
gone further toward definition, measurement, and rules. The problems of common
objectives and structural understanding, discussed above, are admittedly severe
in coordinating rules on subsidies. Yet in the absence of coordination, unila-
teral attempts to define, measure, and countervail them seem inevitable (Shuman
and Verrill (1984)). The idea of a coordinated defining and "binding't of sub-
sidies, much as tariffs are "bound't in the GATT, is considered below.
(4) Motive Force. Impetus is another aspect of policy coordination not
captured in simple accounts. Coordination can be imposed, agreed, or implicitly
chosen, with varying implications along a continuum that joins them.
Coordination is imposed when weaker, smaller, or less skilled agents harmonize
their policies with those of a strong, large, or skilled agent, which tailors
its policy to elicit policy response among the followers that furthers its own
goals. Coordination is agreed when enough consensus exists on objectives and
structure among agents of comparable strength that they negotiate a compact.
Coordination can be implicitly chosen even in the absence of a compact (or
with an ineffective one) when agents recognize at least some gain from
mutually cooperative outcomes and some penalty from cheating --asin the con-
cept of implicit collusion among oligopolistic producers. In this light,
early GAIT coordination of trade policy might illustrate the imposing force of
a hegemonic United States; Kennedy-Round coordination might illustrate expli-
cit agreement among equals; and current coordination might illustrate the kind
of implicit impetus that is maintained solely by tenuous conjectures of gains24
"if we all keep cooperating" and penalties "if I defect." The stability of the
coordination seems greatest when imposed and weakest when implicit. Its
"representativeness," however --itsreflection of the collective objectives of
participants --maybe greatest when it is agreed or negotiated among equals.
Among other things, this implies a potential opportunity in the future for
atypical participants to initiate fruitful ideas for enhancing coordination.
The United States may today be in a better position to respond to cooperating,
coordinating ideas from abroad --e.g.from Israel, Canada, Japan, Mexico --than
to initiate them itself. We turn in the next section to prospects such as this
in the midst of changing environments for trade policy coordination.25
II. CHANGING ENVIRONMENTS AND PROSPECTS FOR
COORDINATION OF TRADE POLICY
A. Introduction
The environment for trade policy coordination today is quite different than
in the early post-World War II period when many enduring conventions of coor-
dination were established under the GAIT.
In the policy environment for coordination, the most significant changes
have been the levelling out of influence among national governments relative
to U.S. dominance in the early post-war period, and the development of new
administrative instruments of trade policy to replace the limitations that the
GAIT successfully coordinated for tariffs. In the economic environment for
coordination, the most significant change has been the growth of large, mobile
corporations that themselves practice coordination across borders. They are
multinational in both operations and ownership. In the intellectual environ-
ment, these changes have been captured in the development of an analysis of
trade policy coordination in strategic environments --thosewith small num-
bers of large rival firms and/or governments —-thathas challenged insights
from the venerable competitive consensus.
These environmental changes interact with each other. Multinational
corporations make it harder for any government to define and pursue its "own"
national interest. Returns to the "capital endowment" that a country's resi-
dents own depend on revenue from far flung foreign affiliates as well as revenue
from home. Discriminatory border policies that increase revenue from one source
at the expense of another have ambiguous effects on "our" multinational firms
and their owners. Firms that are largely "ours" (majority-owned) may
nevertheless pay significant fractions of their revenues to foreign share-26
holders. Strategic influence over the location and competitiveness of large,
mobile multinationals is an understandably important objective of modern trade
policy, and leads to concerns about market access and administrative instru-
ments such as performance requirements, tax incentives, and unitary tax systems.
The sensitivity of firms to these policies aggravates the adjustment problems
faced by owners of immobile factors of production --narrowlyskilled workers,
farmers, civil servants. Such groups are not internationally coordinated, but
may be large and coordinated internally (e.g., labor unions). Trade policies
that protect and insure them, or that help them adjust to shifting sectoral
prosperity, have a very different orientation than trade policies that expand
markets abroad for exporting and multinational firms, insuring their right of
establishment and fair competition. A country's own internal policy coor-
dination can be undermined by a schizophrenia in which departments of commerce
and ministries of industry promote "competitiveness"-enhancing trade policies
while departments of agriculture and ministries of labor promote protectionist
trade policies. International policy coordination is all the more difficult
when large internal trade-policy constituencies are uncoordinated or hostile.19
19
Proponents of free trade and skeptics about the virtue of coordination of
course argue that this schizophrenia is "good." See Price (1986) and
Goldstein (1986) for descriptions of these different constituencies in their
influence on U.S. trade policy. Destler (1986) contains an excellent up-to-
date evaluation of United States internal coordination of trade policy.
The following sub-sections describe these environmental changes in more
detail and trace their implications for trade policy coordination.27
B. Shifts in the Policy Environment
Policy environments have evolved (devolved?) since the 1950s and early
1960s. Strategic interaction among governments has come to reflect shifts in
relative economic size and influence. New instruments, institutions, and prin-
ciples of strategic policy interaction have emerged.
(1) Relative National Formany reasons, dominant trade-policy
leadership fell to the United States early after World War u.20 Its economy was
20
Baldwin (1986a) and Destler (1986, pp. 42-47) provide informative perspec—
tives on the material in this sub-section.
least devastated by the war. Its military forces spearheaded resistance to
Soviet expansion, and played important roles in European and Japanese economic
reconstruction. It vetoed the multilaterally planned International Trade
Organization (Diebold (1952)) in favor of a compact of its narrow commercial
provisions, which became the GATT, more U.S.-patterned than the ITO would have
been.
In strategic terms, this was a period of hegemonic interaction. Governments
of relatively weak countries did not behave strategically. They tended to take
U.S. trade policies as given, and to adopt whatever trade policies seemed best
for themselves, without perceiving much scope for influencing the U.S. thereby.
U.S. incentives were to act strategically, but in a unique way. The U.S. tended
to choose trade initiatives mindful of collective foreign response, such as in
its encouragement of European economic integration. But it could afford to be
impassively obliging toward recalcitrance or provocation by single trading part-
ners, because the impacts were relatively small. This unusual combination of
multilateral strategizing and bilateral impassiveness is similar to what one
might expect from a large firm in an industry with a fringe of small perfect28
competitors. The large firm will be strategically calculating toward the aggre-
gated collection of competitors, but will appear unflappable toward isolated
deviance.
Two things change if small agents in hegemonic environments grow signif i-
cantly relative to the hegemon. They begin to act strategically toward the
hegemon, seeking to press advantage and avoid its perceived "exploitation"; and
the hegemon no longer finds their provocations too minor to warrant response.
All this seems to have characterized the trade policy environment of the
past 40 years. First Europe and then Japan (and even several other countries)
have grown relative to the U.S. in key indicators of economic influence.
Patterns for two such indicators are illustrated in Tables 2B.1 and 2B.221
21 . .
Againenvironmental changes can be seen to interact with each other. The
convergence in per capita income among the countries in Table 2B.1 encourages
especially the growth of intra-industry trade, based on product differentiation,
variety, and scale. These characteristics often engender imperfectly corn-
pet-itive market structure (section C(1) below) and significant reshufflings of
narrow product "niches" among firms as technological change and other shocks
occur, with consequent volatility for immobile factors (section C(2) below).
Such newly influential governments have begun to shape their trade policy
strategically, attentively to U.S. reponse, e.g. Tokyo-Round tariff-cutting
initiatives by the European Community. And the U.S. government has become much
more mindful of the domestic injury caused by "unfair" trade practices among
its large trading partners, and consequently much more active in legislating
trade-policy remedies. Figure 2B.1 reveals the rise in unfair trade activity
(bottom panel) relative to escape clause activity (top panel), which has
actually fallen. Table 2B.3 shows the recent acceleration of U.S. trade
legislation, much of which is aimed at "redressing inequity."29
TABLE 2B.1
RATIO: NATIONAL REAL GOP PER CAPITA1
TO THE EQUIVALENT FOR THE AGGREGATE
OF THE TEN COUNTRIES IN THE TABLE
YearBrazil Mexico Korea India Japan US. Germany FranceU.K. Italy
19530.4160.6910.309 0.220 0.6192.963 1.4641.473 1.751 0.961
19630.4790.7870.307 0.195 1.0172.633 1.9441.7141.6981.269
19730.5700.8250.454 0.156 1.7032.543 2.0591.9691.6301.343
19770.6570.8570.574 0.163 1.7112.511 1.0962.0301.5791.454
19830.5950.9550.956 0.158 2.0092.560 1.8351.8672.0101.583
19840.5350.8550.989 0.155 2.0742.744 1.7561.7061.8401.560
Source: Real GOP Per Capita: 1953, 1963, 1973, 1977 from Kravis, Heston,
and Summers (1982, pp. 330-336).
1983, 1984 from World Bank (1985, 1986) data spliced to Kravis, Heston,
and Summers data in the following manner:
table entry =y*.k/p
where y* =GNPper capita in 1983 or 1984 dollars (World Bank (1985, 1986))
k =Ratioof Kravis, Heston, Summers figure for 1975
Real GDP per capita to World Bank figure for 1975
GNP per capita
p =1983or 1984 deflator for U.S. GNP assuming 1975 =1.00,
from International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics Yearbook, 1986, pp. 690-691.
Sources: Population: 19532, 1963, 1973 from U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1980); 1977, 1983, 1984 from World Bank (1979,
1985, 1986).
11n 1975 dollar prices.
2Aug. 1950-1955.30
TABLE 2B.2
PERCENT SHARE OF EXPORTS IN AGGREGATE EXPORTS
OF THE TEN COUNTRIES IN THE TABLE
Source: InternationalMonetary Fund, International Financial Statistics
Yearbook, 1981, 1985 issues.
YearBrazilMexicoKoreaIndiaJapanU.S.GermanyFranceU.K.Italy
1953 4.1 1.6 0.1 2.9 3.4 41.8 11.7 10.6 19.9 4.0
1963 1.9 1.3 0.1 2.2 7.5 32.0 20.0 11.2 16.8 6.9
1973 2.2 0.8 1.1 1.013.2 25.4 24.1 13.1 11.1 7.9
1977 2.3 0.9 1.9 1.215.5 23.2 22.6 12.5 11.2 8.7
1983 2.6 2.5 2.9 1.1 17.5 23.4 19.8 11.1 10.7 8.5

























































































































































































































































































































Congress Destler1 (1986) Ahearn2(1986)
(years) count count
96th (1979-80) 62 -- 1089 --
97th(1981—82) 56 (-10%) 1150 (—6%)
98th (1983-84) 57 (i-2%) 1401 (+22%)
99th (1985-86) 933 (+60%) 1758k (+25%)
1
Counts bills whose primary purpose was to restrict trade or benefit
U.S. producers.
2Counts bills employing 20 trade-related terms, some to expand trade, some
to protect, with various shades based on personal evaluation.
3 . 1985figure times 2.
Growth rate between January-September of 1985 and January-September of
1983 applied to number of bills introduced to 98th Congress: (49/30) x 57.
Sources: Destler (1986, pp. 75—76), Ahearn (1986).33
Instead of being analogous to an industry with one large firmfacing a
fringe of small competitors, the trade policy environment today is closer toa
genuine oligopoly, with a small number of large "co-equals."
This has many implications.
(a) It suggests that trade policy coordination cannot feasibly beimposed,
but must be either explicitly negotiated ("agreed" in thelanguage of Section
IC) or implicitly adhered to. The United States can no longer dictate the
the timing, agenda, or formuli for multilateral trade liberalization,as
illustrated by comparing the outcomes of GAIT Ministerialmeetings in November
1982 and September 1986 to those prior to the Kennedy Round in 1963(Baldwin
(1986a, pp. 5—12)).
(b) It suggests that any of the co-equal governments can initiate trade
policy coordination, not just the historic "leader."22 In fact if the historic
22
Baldwin and Richardson (1987, p. 143) list several reasons why trade
policy coordination among co-equal governments might be just as stable as hege-
monic coordination. They also mention, however, that itsuggests different
"styles" or "tactics" of trade policy for all the participants.
leader is nursing a sense of injustice and grievance over lost("stolen")
influence, with sporadic withdrawal and "lashing out" as in inter-personal
conflict, then it might enhance the chance of success for coordinating
initiative to be reversed. The United States may, today in particular, be
better able to respond cooperatively to cooperative initiative abroad than to
defend taking cooperative initiative itself.23 The posture implied f or
23
See the discussion of hostile environments in Section IB(2).
governments in Europe and Japan is more aggressively inviting than usual;34
that implied for the U.S. government is more "seductively responsive" than
usual24
24
See Richardson (1987a, p. 289; 1985, p. 97). SeealsoDestler (1986,
pp. 48-49), who remarks that
(S]ince the new competitors were slow to
assert leadership in multilateral trade
negotiations, there was a growing divergence
between the loci of trade-political activism
and trade-economic power.
The reasoning is quite similar that underlies the observation that the United
States still has strong leadership to preserve present trade policy coor-
dination, by refraining from hostile and/or uncoordinated initiatives, yet has
lost leadership power to advance coordination. See Baldwin and Richardson
(1987, pp. 123-124), for example.
(c) It suggests that if trade policy leadership is not adequately forth-
coming from newly co-equal governments, there may be reason to invest
"independent agents" with specified leadership functions. Such functions might
include monitoring, reporting, and initiating meetings (and perhaps even
complaints). Suggestions range from radical to mild. Some favor restructuring
the GAIT institutionally to resemble the International Monetary Fund (Camps and
25
Diebold (1983, pp. 59-67)).
25The GAIT has never technically "been" an "institution" at all --only
a "compact with signatories" --unlikethe IMF, with executive directors,
standing committees, rules of order and representation of membership.
Others suggest merely the creation of an Independent Trade Policy Committee
("serviced by the GATI Secretariat") (GAIT Wisemen (1985, p. 42)) or a permanent
negotiating committee (Aho and Aronson (1985, p. 48)). The aim of all such
suggestions is to facilitate leadership impetus and provision of accurate35
information, both crucial to maintaining policy coordination and avoiding devo-
lution into disarray and possibly trade war.
(d) It suggests the advent of discriminatory trade—policy coalitions.
A coalition is coordination of limited scope, among a sub—set of trading
partners over (perhaps) a sub-set of issues. It is a natural occurrence in
strategic interaction among co-equals, and is by its nature discriminatory
(not MFN). A hegemonic environment by its nature provides no
motive for coalitions, either for the large agent or for the many small ones.
These insights seem little appreciated in recent discussions. Today's trade
policy environment is structurally conducive to coalitions and hostile to MFN,
whereas the postwar hegemonic environment was the opposite. The difficult
question is whether conservation efforts aimed at preserving the life of this
endangered animal (MFN) are still worthwhile, or whether inevitable extinction
should be hastened in an effort to breed species more at home in today's jungle!
(e) It suggests that if implicit trade policy coordination is followed,
(see Section 1C(4)) then periods of cooperation may be punctuated by periods
of "punishment" for perceived policy violation, with, of course, counter—
retaliation and symptoms of trade war.26 Difficult technical questions involve
26See, for descriptions of implicit coordination in the context of oligopoly
and trade policy, Friedman (1977), Jensen and Thursby (1983), Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986), and Lambson and Richardson (1987).
how the probability and duration of such periods vary with asymmetries in the
size of the agents involved or with the size of the parties or coalitions being
"punished,"27 and what sort of dispute-settlement mechanisms most predictably36
27
On an industrial counterpart to these issues, see Lambson and Richardson
(1987). One among several conclusions they draw for the case of price-setting
supergames is that symmetry among firms stabilizes implicit collusion, making
"punishment" shorter and less likely, compared to slightly asymmetric con-
figurations of firms.
restore the peace of implicit coordination.
(2) New Instruments, Institutions and Principles.
(a) Administered Intervention. Every coordination compact is at risk
because of the constant temptation for each rival to try surreptitiously to
avoid the constraints on behavior --thatis, to "cheat" secretly on one's
partner—rivals.
This instability can be seen in the growth of "administered intervention",
aimed surreptitiously at undoing the effects of GAIT-coordinated reductions in
tariff bindings. Administered intervention is flexible, discretionary decision-
making toward opaque non-tax instruments of import protection and export promo-
tion. It includes voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing agreements,
standards, licensing, and internal distribution barriers to imports, as well as
performance requirements, tax forgiveness, credit guarantees, and implicit sub-
sidies of many types for exports.
Whalley (1985) provides a striking way to illustrate the significance of
administered intervention. In estimating the welfare effects of complete remo-
val of both tariffs and non-tariff barriers to imports, he finds the latter to
account for more than half of the estimated effects. His calculations are sum-
marized in Table 28.4.28 According to them, administered intervention affects
the exports and imports of Japan the most and the United States the least.37
TABLE 2B.4
NON-TARIFF BARRIER SHARE OF
OWN-COUNTRY WELFARE






United States 42 to 57 percent 40 to 47 percent
European Community 52 to 62 percent 56 to 62 percent
Japan 58 to 75 percent 53 to 69 percent
1Low number in each cellassigns none of the "interaction effect"
from removing tariffs and NIBs together to NTB& high number assigns
all the interaction effect to NIBs.
Source: Whalley (1985, pp. 181-182).38
28They seem a more meaningful way to measure the relative importance of
administered intervention than alternatives, such as tabulations of the share of
trade affected in some fashion by nontariff barriers (Balassa and Balassa (1984),
Nogues, Olechowski, and Winters (1986a, b)).
One implication of the greater use of administered intervention is intri-
cacy. It becomes harder to identify foreign policies, much less measure their
effects. It also becomes harder to implement one's own trade objectives.
Intricacy raises the resource cost of estimating and monitoring, and slows down
trade policymaking. In the United States, administrative intervention in trade,
unlike tariffs, invades the turfs of regulatory agencies, congressional over-
sight committees, and sometimes even the judiciary.
Intricacy increases allegations of unfairness and discrimination because
administrative intervention is inherently opaque. Opaqueness heightens suspi-
cions that something discriminatory and unfair is going on below surface
appearances. Information about administered intervention can become so costly
for non—insiders to obtain that extraordinary mechanisms are needful to obtain
it, e.g., "protection balance sheets" and "surveillance reports" (GAIT Wisemen
(1985, pp. 35, 42)). The value of information for maintaining coordinated
cooperation is higher in environments with administered intervention than in
those with more transparent trade policy instruments like tariffs, quotas, and
export subsidies. Economists who applaud the benefits of price competition but
are chary of nonprice competition (advertising and so on) might consider the
trade policy analog. There may be much clearer benefits to "tariff com-
petitiont' --negotiatingcoordinated concessions in the traditional way,
threatening tax-based retaliation, and so on --thanto competition and coor-
dination among governments in administered intervention. All the features that
make prices effective and efficient signals in private resource allocation make39
tariffs and other trade taxes effective and efficient signals in policy coor-
dination. Among other things, this supports the recommendation sometimes heard
for "re—tariffication" (e.g., Hufbauer and Rosen (1986)).
Another implication of administered intervention is heightened "pre—emptive
consciousness". Anticipations of a brave new world of coordinated (voluntary)
export restraints, with market shares allotted according to the historical sta-
tus quo, creates a race among large firms, and maybe entire industries, to
"stake out claims" by penetrating and expanding quickly. Administered interven-
tion may thus bring import surges upon itself. They are the rationalresponse
to expectations that a government will soon decide to vest the import "rights"
of existing large suppliers in a set of "fair shares." Steel firms and auto—
makers abroad observe that it happened in apparel and anticipate it for them-
selves; machine toolmakers abroad observe that it happened in steel and autos
and anticipate it for themselves; and so on.29 Tariffs and other transparent
29
Each is playing a rational strategy for an "end game," as illustrated for
example by Lawrence and Lawrence (1985). An end game is one in which a future
equilibrium is known, in this case cartelized industrial structure, and agents
choose optimal strategies for approaching it over time.
policy instruments have not historically created the same pre-emptive surges
because both levels and changes were transparently bound into the GAIT.
(b) "Minilateralism". Allegations of unfair and injurious behavior on the
part of large trading partners who have "caught up" with the United States have
made it more vigilant about unfair trade from any source --evensmall trading
partners come under scrutiny. All developed countries view the catch-up growth
of Newly Industrializing Countries, visible most clearly for Brazil, Mexico, and
Korea in Table 2B.1, with alarm and similar suspicions. (Indeed there are40
legitimate grounds for such suspicions as the economic environment includes
more and more internationally coordinated multinational firms, as discussed in
the next section.) Although negotiation with dynamic small competitors may
not seem worthwhile, exclusion of them from multilateral trade policy initiati-
ves is easy and quite tempting. Isolation of "offenders" is a seemingly cheaper
alternative to coordinated dispute settlement.
Thus the apparent growth of unfair trade becomes one of the forces behind
"minilateralism," the tendency to circle the wagons, to reduce the number of
participants involved in trade policy coordination.30 This has virtue
30Curzon and Curzon (1985), for example, recommend that the (fair) traders
within the GAIT form a coalition that aims at a free trade area that would
"eventually" cover "substantially all" trade, thereby attaining consistently
with Article XXIV, and isolate the non (unfair) traders.
(Section IC(2) to the extent that international catch-up pressures really do
depend importantly on unfair practices. But to the extent that these are
just fair and normal competitive pressures from new entrants, coordinated
"minilateralism" is synonymous with barriers to entry and cartelization,
and has little economic merit.
A closely related force behind minilateralism is the disparity of market
dependence among GAIT countries. Degrees of regulation vary, as does reliance
on private rather than state-owned and supported firms (see below). Multi-
lateral negotiations of a traditional kind have become increasingly cumbersome
because of differences of objective and structural understanding.
These differences lead naturally to initiatives that narrow the geographi-
cal and sectoral scope of negotiations in order to make any progress at all.41
The 1986 report of the United States Trade Representative (USTR (1986, pp.
61—62)) is remarkably blunt:
Nevertheless, multilateral negotiations are not an end in
themselves....
America has decided to pursue trade liberalization
opportunities wherever and whenever they exist, whether
in a multilateral, plurilateral or bilateral context.
Although the United States would prefer pursuing trade
liberalization through multilateral negotiations, it is
deeply concerned that the process may now be too cumbersome to
achieve meaningful and timely results. Indeed, the increasing
number of GAIT Contracting Parties and growing divergence of
their viewpoints guarantee ever more awkward and prolonged
negotiations....
If the United States cannot reach timely trade agreements
on a multilateral basis, it is prepared to progress on trade
issues by negotiating on a bilateral or plurilateral basis with
like-minded nations.
It is time to recognize that across-the-board discussions
among all GAIT members may not be the best way to promote GAIT
goals. There is a greater need for a variety of arrangements
under the GAIT umbrella so trade liberalization can progress on
at least some fronts without waiting for all issues to be settled
to all parties' satisfaction. When a group of countries can
negotiate a trade liberalizing agreement, provision should be
made for its acceptance under the GAIT.
Consistent with this intent, the United States has in the past few years
negotiated: a quite inclusive free trade agreement with Israel and sectoral
liberalization with Japan (Market-Oriented Sector Specific, or MOSS initiati-
ves) and Caribbean trading partners. Negotiations continue with Canada
toward sectoral free trade. The European Community, of course, continues to
expand the boundaries of its own preferential liberalization. And 48 of the
largest developing countries agreed in May, 1986 to begin trade negotiations
among themselves under a Global System of Trade Preferences (GSIP).42
A worrisome implication of these minilateral trends is, of course, that
the world may become fragmented into hostile trading blocs, Uruguay Round
notwithstanding. There is a more promising perspective, however. It is that
in today's policy environment only minilateral liberalizing coordination is
feasible. More than that, it is an ideal crucible in which to experiment with
new coordination techniques: new definitions, rules, monitoring arrangements,
and dispute settlement procedures. Minilateral coordination within the European
Community, for example, is almost surely going to involve important progress on
coordinating trade policy in services, such as in telecommunications.
Minilateral coordination between Canada and the United States is almost surely
going to make progress on unfair trade rules and procedures. In the longer run,
multilateral negotiations over new GATT codes and among "blocs" (a pejorative
term in this context) may be usefully informed by the precedents and experiments
of minilateralism.
It is undeniable that these minilateral and bilateral movements are
retreats from multilateral coordination of the historic kind, resting on the
MFN principle (unconditional in principle, but in the practice of nearly every
country, quite conditioned). Strategic "retreats" may, however, allow trade
policy coordination to regroup beneficially just as they do an army. They may
furthermore be wise if increasing parity among countries in economic influence
undermines MFN and enhances the idea of optimal coalition-building (see point
d of Section 8(1) above). In this light, it might be better not to call
this a retreat from multilateralism based on MFN, but, for example, to call it
a "new" multilateralism based on a "More-Favored—Nation Principle"!31 The
31, ,, . ..
'Newmultilateralism is the term used by Camps and Diebold (1983).
"More-Favored-Nation" treatment is a term suggested by Thomas 0. Bayard.43
GATT Codes of the Tokyo Round can in fact be seen as an innovative vehicle for
the new multilateral ism.
(c) GAIT Codes. GATT codes are an innovative device for adopting the
best aspects of coordinated minilateralism, controlling the worstaspects of
administered intervention, and maintaining the many GAIT mechanisms that con-
tinue to be relevant to liberalizing coordination.
Five important codes were negotiated during the Tokyo Round of GATT
negotiations --onsubsidies, procurement, standards, import licensing, and
customs valuation. Each was negotiated by a subset of GATT members, each on a
trade policy issue of narrow scope. Each forms a supplement to the GAIT, with
five independent lists of signatories that do not include all GATI members.By
restricting participation and focussing on narrow issues, the Codes reduced the
potential for hostile undermining of coordination. Their provisions are,
however, applied in principle on an MFN basis (except by the United States whose
application of the first three codes was conditional).32 Each is administered by
32See Stern, Jackson, and Hoekman(1986, p. 6). This paper is a thorough
evaluation of the operational features of the codes, although not their
economic effects or legal standing.
a Committee of Signatories serviced by the GAIT Secretariat, and each has its
own dispute settlement mechanism.
In general, the Tokyo Round Codes aimed at rules and procedures for har-
moriization and transparency, rather than at significant liberalization. This
is one reason for not according undue weight to assessments of their "only
modest" success, or to the general agreement among commentators that the
subsidies code in particular has not worked well. They might be judged more
optimistically as successful "standstillt' agreements, strategic defenses44
against de-coordination rather than catalysts of coordination.33 They might
33 . .. .. . Liberalizingcoordination is, however, a logical future step, involving
probably "trade in concessions across Codes" --accessionby one country to
one code in return for accession to another by another, forgoing insistence
on some provision in one code for a rival's concession in another code, etc.
also be judged successful for creating strategically ambiguous34 GAIT-con-
34Ambiguity can sometimes be a bargaining strength. See, for example,
Dixit (1987, p. 274).
sistent minilateralism. And they are commendable attempts to cope with
administered border intervention in a realistic way.
The Tokyo—Round attempt to negotiate a safeguards code failed, however,
and the subsidies code has room for considerable improvement, comments above
notwithstanding. Acceptable codes on subsidies and safeguards are, in fact,
especially needful because of important changes in the economic environment,
described below.45
C. Shifts in the Economic Environment
Modern trade policy issues arise in economic environments thatseem
increasingly strategic and that do not fit the orthodox competitiveparadigm.
(1) Mobile Multinational Firms. One essential aspect of a firm iscoor-
dination within itself; as firms have grown multinationallyover the past few
decades, corporate international coordination hasgrown apace. There are many
reasons for this growth. The European Community, communications innovation,
capital-market integration, and ambitious development plans all haveencouraged
coproduction, joint ventures, mergers, and global identity. In someglobal
markets, the same few firms compete everywhere. In some nationalmarkets, a
small number of firms vie for a "prize" that is essentially control ofthe whole
national industry. The growth of trade has been morerapid in manufactures --
withpotential for firm-focused economies of scale, technologicalgaps, product
differentiation, and taste for variety --thanin agricultural and mineral pro-
ducts, as shown in Table 2C.1. Within manufactures, the growth of trade has
been more rapid in industries with concentrated, oligopolistic marketstructure
than in those with competitive structure; trade in aircraft, electronicmachi-
nery, chemicals, and petrochemicals grew much faster between 1973 and 1983 than
trade in wood, paper, and foods, as shown in Table 2C2. Table 2C.3 shows
further that U.S. multinational firms maintained their shares of worldexports
over the past 30 years even as the U.S. geographical share declined, and have
grown in their shares of U.S. trade.
In concentrated strategic environments, firms clearly recognize the effect
that their actions have on the behavior of other firms, and often ofgovern-
ments. Governments recognize this, too. They have turned to firm-focused
performance requirements, for which firm-focused favors, such as tax incen-
tives, are returned. Each firm or government conjectures how rivals and other46
TABLE 2C.1
CHANGING COMMODITY COMPOSITION
OF WORLD EXPORTS, 1950-1985
BROAD CATEGORIES
WORLD TRADE AND INCOME SINCE 1950
Volumeindices.1950 =100
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TABLE 6. -LEADINGPRODUCTS IN WORLD MERCHANDISE TRADE
OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN 1983a
Percentage shares
Rank Product categories Percentage sharesin value of world
in value of trade occluding
world trade fuels
1983 1973 1983 1973 1983 1973
I I Crude petroleum 12.4 7.6 ..
2 7 Petroleum products 4.9 2.4 ..
3 4 Passenger motor cars 3.8 3.8 4.7 4.2
4 2 Iron and steel 2.8 4.6 3.5 5.1
5 3 Textile yarn, fabrics, made.up articles 2.6 4.1 3.2 4.6
6 9 Clothing 2.2 2.2 2.8 2.5
7 20 Office machines. data processing equipment, parts 2.2 1.4 2.8 1.5
8 8 Parts and accessories of motor vehicles 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.5
9 45 Gas, natural and manufactured 2.0 0.3 ..
10 13 Artificial resins, plastic materials, articles of plastic 2.0 1.9 2.4 2.1
11 18 Organic chemicals 1.9 1.6 2.4 1.8
12 6 Wood manufactures, paper 1.9 2.4 2.3 2.7
13 5 Cereals and preparations 1.8 2.7 2.2 3.0
14 10 Fruits and vegetables 1.5 2.2 1.9 2.4
IS II Oilseeds. vegetable oils, oil cakes 1.5 2.2 1.8 2.4
16 24Aircraft 1.2 0.9 1.5 1.0
17 17 Telecommunication equipment, paris, accessories 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.7
18 37 Transistors, etc.(eleccronic components) 1.2 0.7 1.5 0.8
19 27 Coffee. tea, cocoa, spices 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.0
20 26 Lorries, special vehicles 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.0
Total of above 51.3 46.6 ..
World trade (market economies) 100.0 100.0 ..
aTrade data are based on import statistics
Source: Appendix Table A9.
Source: GAIT (1985, p. 17).48
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1lncluding majority-owned foreign affiliates.
2Majority-owned only, it would seem.
31957A figure x (1966B figure/1966A figure), where A and B are different
classification systems.
Source: Lipsey and Kravis (1986, p. 29) for columns (1) and (2); Little







agents will react to its own decisions. Governments, furthermore, are sometimes
the owners and indirect managers of firms, and may strategically "game"among
themselves.
Large multinational firms might seem at first impression to be a force
against discriminatory border policy and encouraging to coordinated liberali-
zation of world trade --asinfluential constituents of many different govern-
ments simultaneously, whose flexibility and mobility would be enhanced most
by free trade. This can be true, but need not be in strategic environments.
The Ford Motor Company supports protectionist initiatives in the United States
and Airbus Industries has depended on its sponsoring governments for support;
Toyota and Nissan have not clearly suffered from auto VERs, especially not in
their competition with smaller Japanese automakers. Large firms will sometimes
have potential for influencing (exploiting?) groups without strategic size or
power. Krishna (1983), for example, has shown how oligopolistic domestic and
foreign firms may welcome voluntary export or import quotas. These quotas can
facilitate implicit collusion among them, reducing competitive cheating by sta-
bilizing market shares, at the expense of customers. Or for another example,
oligopolistic national firms wanting to avoid potential entry from abroad may
be able to convince governments correctly that national economic welfare would
indeed be higher with import barriers that protect their market power (Dixit
and Kyle (1985)). Oligopolistic national firms wishing to initiate entry into
some unpenetrated market may be similarly correct to make a national-welfare
case for export subsidies.35
See Brander's and Spencer's contributions to Krugman (1986) and other work
referenced there. These examples are from the new analytical thinking on trade
policy in strategic environments, also surveyed by Grossman and Richardson
(1985) and Richardson (1987b).50
Mobility of multinational firms and their professional work force also
internationalizes ostensibly domestic policies,36 accentuating their spillovers
36
This is the twin of the observation that trade policy has become
increasingly "domesticated," drawn, for example, by Ahearn and Reifman (1984).
abroad and provoking foreign pressure for international policy coordination.
There is of course always some tendency for a country's sectoral policies to
spill over abroad in mirror-image fashion. But the size of these spillovers
is much larger when corporate capital resources are mobile. Most countriest
industrial policies, for example, entail corporate taxes and subsidies that
encourage some domestic sectors at the expense of other domestic sectors --
butalso at the expense of the same favored sectors abroad. Alert multina-
tionals may decide that their expansion can be shifted to whichever of their
affiliates enjoys the most favorable sectoral policy incentives. Domestic
subsidies and taxes can thus easily become an instrument of strategic sectoral
predation among countries.
It is no surprise that as multinational corporate size and strategic
influence have increased, domestic subsidies, performance requirements, and
unfair trade have become hard bones of contention in the policy environment.37
Camps and Diebold (1983, p.22) illustrate this when they write that
one of the basic principles that we think should guide
the new multilateralism ...[is]that the international
community has a legitimate concern with domestic actions
when they have important external effects ..
Therecent claim that strategically calculating policy can shape ("create",
"destroy") a country's comparative advantage is correct, after all, where that
same policy is capable of moving capital endowments from one place to another,51
using the mediating facilities of internationally coordinated firms, and leaving
labor and immobile endowments behind. One county's strategically activesec—
toral policy in that world can also deter another's from beggar—its-neighbor
attempts to shift comparative advantage and desirable employment. Passive (more
exactly impassive) policy does not have this capability f or defensive
deterrence. Policy coordination in such a world is an attempt to establisha
peaceful equilibrium that may nonetheless be backed up by arsenals of strategic
policy weapons!
It is for these reasons easy to endorse the idea that there is unique
importance to Uruguay-Round negotiations on subsidies, including revision of
the existing Subsidies Code.38 At the very least, such negotiations will
38Camps and Diebold (1983,p. 39) comment that:
It is no exaggeration to say that the damage will
ultimately lead to the collapse of the system of
cooperation unless better ways are found to deal
with the conflicts among national industrial
policies.
Policy coordination on subsidies and countervailing duties is also near the
top of Canada's list of reasons for pursuing bilateral trade liberalization
with the United States.
likely generate sharper definitions of spillovers and agreement on procedural
rules (Hufbauer and Shelton-Erb (1984)). And it may be timely for substantive
rules and full-fledged attempts to exchange request-and-offer lists for recipro-
- . — . — It tI • . 39 cal reductions of specified subsidies that would then be bound like tariffs.52
39Baldwin (1986b, pp. 28—34, among other places) outlines a detailed plan
for such negotiations in which modalities from historic rounds of tariff
liberalization are adapted to subsidies. One reason this makes sense is the
inherent (admittedly complex) measurability of subsidies as compared to more
administrative intervention, and hence their susceptibility to coordination by
rules (see Section IC(3) above).
The more fundamental question this prospect raises is whether policy
should be just as coordinated among governments as corporate planning is among
national affiliates. Skeptics about the merits of markets, especially inter-
nationally integrated markets, tend to respond "yes." Skeptics about the
merits of industrial regulation, especially when centralized on a global
(coordinated) scale, tend to respond "no."4°
40
See, for example, McCulloch (198 ,p. ),whospeculates that policy com-
petition among governments exercises a healthy discipline on costly abuses of
their regulatory powers. The framers of the United States Constitution ambi-
guously reserved to Congress the power "to regulate ...commerceamong the
several states" (Article I, Section 8.3), implicitly excluding state governments
from coordinating inter-state trade policy, yet nevertheless reserving the
authority to do so for a centralized body.
(2) Adjustment. Adjustment problems in the economic environment have become
arguably more severe in the past fifteen years. Average unemployment rates and
excess capacity are higher. Burgeoning, globally integrated financial markets
have created volatile changes in exchange rates, international competitiveness,
and goods trade. These changes and the strategic sensitivity of multinational
firms to governments and each other have aggravated the stimuli facing workers,
farmers, and other owners of immobile resources. Their adjustment problems are
made even worse by the potential for substitutability between goods trade and
mobile corporate capital. When goods and firms are both internationally mobile,
then only slight changes in the economic or policy environment can bring about53
striking changes in exports, imports, and the livelihood of immobile factors
that are tied closely to them (Mundell (1957)). To a large multinational firm,
moving the goods and moving the plant across borders are close substitutes --
theyare not to its immobile workers and their unions. Displaced workers and
mid-level managers who are unable to acquire or transfer skills useful to
alternative sectors face long periods of unemployment and below-average
earnings.
Table 2C.4 hints at the size of the adjustment problem that might face
immobile workers from trade liberalization in today's economic environment.
Sector-by-sector employment changes are quite large, even though their aggre-
gate (sum) may be small. They are much larger than similar estimates for
Tokyo-Round liberalization in the late 1970s by Baldwin, Mutti, and Richardson
(1980, p. 419).
In brief, immobile workers seem to be saddled with sharper and more frequent
unanticipated shocks from international forces than in the past (Grossman and
Richardson (1984, pp. 20-23)). Some of the agents who represent them are stra-
tegically large within countries, although uncoordinated across them, such as
unions, regional governments, and Departments (Ministries) of Agriculture.
Strate9ic interaction between them and their owngovernmentcan lead to indef i-
nite protection -—akind of strategic paralysis of unproductivity.
In this environment the challenge to all policy is formidable, both
national and internationally coordinated policy. Adjustment burdens can be
reduced if national policy minimizes the economic hardship to immobile
segments of the population, and sensible policy may include temporary and
degressive protection (Diamond (1982)). But commitment to eventual adjustment54
TABLE 2C.4
PercentageChange in Japanese and U.S. Employment
by Sector under Trade Liberalization
!%ofChangein %ofChangein
Total JapaneseTotal U.S.
Employment with Employment with








1 Agric,Forestry & Fisheries —50.2% +96.9%
310 Food, Beverages & Tobacco +9.4 —4.9
321Textiles +18.8 : —24.1
322Wearing Apparel : —1.3 —0.6
323Leather Products : +0.3 —1.7
324Footwear +0.1 —0.1
331 Wood Product —0.7 —1.3
332Furniture and Fixtures + 0.2 —0.1
341 Paper and Paper Products —2.0
342 Printing and Publishing —0.7
35A Chemicals —3.7
35B Petroleum and ReI.Prod. —9.5 +0.2
355 Rubber Products + 1.7 —2.2
36A Nonmetal Mm. Products 2.3 —1.0
362 Glass and Glass Products +0.4 —0.5
371Iron and Steel + 26.0 —7.8
372Nonferrous Metals 1.3 —1.4
381 Metal Products +1.9 —2.5
382 Nonelectric Machinery + 5.0 —2.8
383 Electric Machinery —2.8
384 Transport Equipment +4.2 + 1.0
38A Miscellaneous Manuf. + 13.3 —14.9
2Mining and Quarrying +4.3 : —2.8
4Electric, Gas & Water +2.7 —1.2
5 Construction —3.2 0.0
6Wholesale and Retail Trade —9.3 —12.6
7 Transportation, Storage + 1.1 —3.3
and Communication
8 Finance, Ins. & Real Est. —2.6 —3.4
9 Commercial, Social and —18.7 —2.2
Personal Services ,
I L _______
Source:Saxonhouse (198 ),p. 6.55
seems a necessity, since rational strategic agents will forecast future
government action when contemplating a specialized investment. Government
commitment to "preservation" makes no private adjustment the strategic and
equilibrium response. Government commitment to unspecified "eventual"
adjustment makes waiting the strategic and equilibrium response. Only cre—
dible commitment to adjustment makes it possible for anticipations of govern-
ment reaction to alter ex ante location and allocation decisions.
Yet it is hard for a national government on its own to guarantee credibly
that protection is only temporary or degressive. If the conditions that
justified the protection continue to exist, the incentives are nearly irre-
sistible for the government to repeat its "temporary" dose at similar
intensity -—andto repeat it again and again. If strategic agents sense how
irresistible this pattern is, they will refuse to believe in the proclaimed
temporariness of the trade policy, and will remain active in the protected
sector rather than exiting. Their continued activity keeps conditions the
same as those that warranted the trade policy in the first place, and seduces
the government to repeat its temporary protection. The sequence then repeats.
It should be clear that this cycle represents a strategic equilibrium, a posi-
tion of rest in which temporary or degressive trade policy is impossible (that
is, not sustained by the postulated strategic behavior).41
41me policy problem is known technically as time inconsistency --this
year's optimal value for next year's policy intensity will no longer look opti-
mal when next year rolls around. The same problem can afflict all temporary
policy. See Staiger and Tabellini (1986) and Feenstra (1986) for further
applications of the idea to trade policy.
Strategic policy coordination among governments can help alleviate this
problem. Under GATT rules trading-partner governments can already request56
consultation and compensation when a temporary trade policy becomes permanent.
If the consultation/compensation mechanism were working well, then the first
government's pledge of transience would become more credible. Private agents
would be more likely to exit. Such consultation and compensation has been
largely abandoned, however, as have other safeguard procedures under Article
XIX of the GAIT. This heightens the urgency of safeguard revisions in
Uruguay—Round negotiations, and explains the possible appeal of a standing
"adjustment committee" (GAIT Wisemen (1985, pp. 43-44)) that would monitor
temporary, degressive protection and facilitate international pressure on a
government to keep its degressivity credible to domestic constituents. A
standing committee with this charge illustrates how an "independent agent"
can sometimes help strategic rivals to achieve coordination by making their
promises credible, discussed in Section B above.42
42The reasoning is the same that underlies the independence of a central
bank from political forces, and that accords the IMF or a new intermediary an
independent role in helping debtors' promises appear credible to creditors.
There are reasons, of course, why trade policy may not be the ideal
insulator of an economy from unforeseen shocks, nor the most desirable cata-
lyst for adjustment. A less wasteful alternative for achieving the same goal
might be a loan and insurance scheme for worker experience and investment in
human capital (Grossman and Richardson (1984, p. 26)), providing benefits
(contingent on payment of premiums) dependent on the state of competition from
abroad. Under such a program, countries would continue to enjoy the benefits of
lowpriced imports and incentives for factor reallocation might be preserved.57
Strategic policy coordination could have a role to play here as well, in
that some of the beneficiaries from "our" smoother adjustment are "their" firms,
workers, and unions who take over the market. These agents might therefore
fairly be expected to contribute to the insurance premiums that help fund our
adjustment. More exactly, since successful adjustment creates favorable foreign
spillovers, coordinated international loan and insurance schemes may some day be
worth consideration, perhaps financed most easily by a small tax on all inter-
national transactions (capital movements as well as trade), or possibly by a
more targetted but larger tax or trade surpluses, and administered by the GAIT's
standing adjustment committee described above. Coordinated international loan
and insurance programs might also be more resistant than national schemes to
moral hazard problems and to "capture" by political forces (e.g., the U.S.
government's use of trade adjustment assistance to assuage autoworkers in the
late 1970s).58
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